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Abstract 
Previous studies of intergenerational income mobility have not considered potential 
birth- order or family-size effects in the estimated income elasticity. This paper uses a 
large sample of individuals born between 1962 and 1964; income elasticities with respect 
to parents’ incomes are estimated for individuals with different birth-order positions and 
family sizes. Results based on labor income and total income for sons and daughters are 
reported separately. The elasticity tends to decrease with family size as well as with birth 
order for a given family size, especially in the labor-income analysis of fathers and sons.  
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1. Introduction 
Rising interest in intergenerational income mobility has generated many studies of the 
relation between the long-run income of parents and children. 1 The interest in the 
transmission of economic status from one generation to another is generally motivated 
by a wish to determine the degree of equality of opportunity. The extensive Swedish 
welfare system is partly interpreted as a desire to promote equal opportunities: for 
instance, most schools are publicly financed and higher education is free of charge to 
reduce the importance of family background. In this way, studies that examine the 
intergenerational income mobility can be useful as equality barometers in society. 
The empirical studies in this area have not yet considered potential birth-order or 
family-size effects in the income relation of parents and children. Children’s similarities 
to their parents and their tendencies to approach a similar income level may, to some 
degree, depend on whether or not they are the only child in the household. The presence 
of several siblings reduces the time that the parents are able to devote to each child. The 
unique position in the birth order of each child may also have an impact on this process. 
For example, first-born children grow up in more adult-oriented environments than 
later-born children. Earlier studies of intergenerational income mobility only provide 
average income elasticities over individuals from all categories of birth-order positions 
and family sizes. 
The focus in this study is to find out whether or not income elasticities for 
individuals with different birth-order positions and family sizes deviate from the average 
income elasticity. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that poses this question and 
the lack of research is probably due to researchers being dependent on surveys with 
limited sample sizes. This study is based on large register-based data sets that permit 
separate analysis of small subgroups. The first part of the analysis provides 
 
1 See Solon (1999) for a survey.  
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conventionally estimated average income elasticities with respect to the father’s and the 
mother’s income for both sons and daughters. The second part of the analysis allows for 
birth-order and family-size differences in the estimated elasticities. Throughout the 
paper, family size refers to the number of biological whole-siblings in the family. Fathers’ 
and mothers’ incomes are used separately in the analysis and several income restrictions 
are applied in order to deal with the fact that many mothers worked part-time in the 
1970s.  
The average income elasticity in Sweden for fathers and sons is estimated to be 
around 0.25 (Björklund and Jäntti 1997, Björklund and Chadwick 2003).2 Coach and 
Dunn (1997) estimate the German father-son income elasticity to 0.11 and Dearden et al.
(1997) report a British estimate of 0.57. In the US, the elasticity for fathers and sons is 
estimated to be around 0.40, and the estimates for fathers and daughters were about the 
same (Solon 1992, Zimmerman 1992, Eide and Showalter 1999, Chadwick and Solon 
2002).3 Using a 16-year average of fathers’ earnings, Mazumder (2005) estimates the US 
elasticity for fathers and sons to 0.60. In Canada, finally, the elasticity for fathers and 
sons is about 0.20 (Corak and Heisz 1999).  
So there are considerable country differences in the average intergenerational income 
elasticity and still, there is little knowledge about what actually drives the transmission of 
income. Allowing for birth-order and family-size differences is one way to learn more 
about the mechanisms behind the transmission of economic status between generations. 
For example, if there were large differences in the income elasticity in large and small 
families, it could be motivated to go further and investigate if there is a pattern in the 
intergenerational income elasticity among countries with different fertility rates. If the 
 
2 Österberg (2000) presents a much lower estimate, 0.13. Grawe (2006) organizes estimates of 
intergenerational earnings elasticity by mean age of fathers and finds a pattern of low elasticity in 
samples with old fathers. Considering that Österberg observes fathers late in the lifecycle, Grawe 
concludes that her result is not to be seen as an outlier. Österberg also includes non-biological fathers 
which is likely to reduce the elasticity. See Österbacka (2001) for results on Finnish data. 
3 See e.g. Becker and Tomes (1986) for an overview of results from 1970s and 1980s. 
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income elasticity to some degree is connected to fertility rates, this might help explain the 
different income elasticity levels in countries with varying fertility rates. On the other 
hand, if there are no differences in the elasticity in large and small families, the reason to 
the country differences in intergenerational income elasticity has to be searched for 
elsewhere. The next section discusses why we might expect birth-order and family-size 
effects in an intergenerational context; section 3 provides a short overview of the existing 
literature on birth-order and family-size effects on the level of earnings and educational 
attainment. Section 4 presents the econometric framework for estimating average income 
elasticities and income elasticities by birth order and family size. Section 5 describes the 
data and the sample selection, section 6 presents the empirical results and section 7 
concludes the paper.  
 
2 Birth-order and family-size effects 
Earlier research discusses a number of ways that birth order can affect individuals’ future 
income levels. Ejrnaes and Pörtner (2004) divide them into the following main 
categories: constraints, household environment and cultural factors. These categories are 
to some extent also relevant for the discussion of family size.  
Financial constraints and imperfect capital markets may reduce opportunities to 
equalize expenditures on children and therefore opportunities for children may vary, 
depending on the birth-order position. Further, when the first child is born, many 
parents are at the start of their careers, while later-born children may arrive when the 
parents are closer to the peak of their careers and earnings profile, especially if there are 
several children in the household (Behrman and Taubman 1986). This may favor later-
born children compared with earlier-born ones.  
From the perspective of constraints, it may be that high-income earners have fewer 
children on average and more resources to spend on each child, compared to low-income 
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earners. Studies have shown that the highest income elasticities between generations are 
estimated at the top of the parents’ income distribution in Sweden (Österberg 2000). This 
predicts a negative relation between the number of siblings and income elasticity.4
The household-environment explanation suggests that the specific number of siblings 
and ages of siblings affect the environment in which the children grow up. Initially, first-
born children spend more time alone with their parents, because there are no other 
siblings with whom to compete for parents’ attention. It has been argued that last-born 
children may also have this advantage (Hanushek 1992). This is a reasonable argument if 
there is a large age difference between the second-to-last and the last-born child.  
Parental separation is another aspect connected to the household-environment 
explanation. Separation from the father—which is still the most common outcome—
may decrease the father’s influence on the children. Because of this, lower income 
elasticity between children and absent fathers may be expected. Björklund and Chadwick 
(2003) find large differences in the income elasticity in father-son samples depending on 
the amount of time they had lived together. For sons who had never lived with their 
biological fathers, the elasticity was equal to zero.  Beyond this general effect, separations 
may also generate birth-order differences in the income elasticity, especially if there are 
large age differences between the siblings. Later-born siblings are younger at the time of 
the separation, so they have a shorter experience of living in the same household as their 
father, compared with older siblings. Therefore, a weaker income relation between the 
father and the later-born siblings may be expected. This will be referred to as a separation 
hypothesis. 
Sulloway (1997), a leading debater about the significance of birth order, argues that 
first-born children are more likely to identify with authority than their younger siblings. 
 
4 However, such a finding would, at least to some degree, depend on the model being incorrectly 
specified and using more flexible functional form may yield a different result. 
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Clausen (1966) discusses the tendency of parents to delegate parts of their authority over 
younger children to the first-born child. He suggests that first-born children tend to 
recognize and accept parental authority more than later-born children. It has also been 
argued that since first-born children grow up in an adult-oriented environment, they tend 
to imitate their parents more than their younger siblings (Behrman and Taubman 1986).5
A related discussion concerns role models and the idea that younger siblings might 
consider older siblings as role models and identify with them, which reduces the relative 
influence from the parents.  
Differences in the family environment that depend on family size may occur because 
parents with several children have less time to devote to each child. The observation that 
economic and social family resources become diluted as the family grows is described as 
a trade-off between “child quantity and child quality” (Blake 1989). Hanushek (1992) 
develops a family maximization model based on a theory presented by Becker (1960) and 
Becker and Lewis (1973) and belongs to both the family environment and the constraints 
category. It distinguishes between public time, which the family spends together, and private 
time, which a child spends alone with one or two parents. Naturally, the amount of public 
time does not necessarily decrease with the number of children in the family, unless the 
parents must work more to support a larger family, while the amount of private time is 
likely to do so. One hypothesis is that there is less parental influence on children in large 
families, which may generate weaker income relations. The intergenerational income 
elasticity would then again be expected to decrease with family size; accordingly, children 
without siblings would be expected to exhibit the largest income elasticity.  
Finally, birth-order effects may also be due to cultural factors. For example, among 
farmers, there is an old tradition that the eldest son inherits the farm. This agricultural 
habit is also common when private companies are inherited within a family. If this 
 
5 Behrman and Taubman (1986) point out that these arguments date back to Galton (1874). 
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tradition still exists, it may be reasonable to predict higher income elasticity among first-
born children.  
 
3. Previous research on birth-order and family-size effects 
While no previous paper has focused on intergenerational income elasticity by birth 
order and family size, there is an extensive literature covering birth order and family size 
effects on the individual’s own wage level, education level, and schooling performance. 
Lindert (1977) finds a negative relation in US data between family size and the expected 
years of schooling. His results also indicate significant sibling position effects on 
schooling performance, where first-born children in large families have an advantage 
over middle-born children. These results are confirmed by Behrman and Taubman 
(1986) who also report birth-order differences on the effect on earnings, but these effects 
become insignificant when controlling for family size. Kessler (1991) does not find any 
significant birth-order or family-size effects on the level or growth of wages in US data. 
In the study by Hanushek (1992), positive effects on schooling performance by being the 
first-born are detected in US data, but in the next step, these effects are entirely explained 
by the first-born’s higher probability of belonging to small families. Black et al. (2005) 
find a negative correlation between family size and children’s education, but with the 
inclusion of birth order variables, the family size effects disappear.6
Björklund and Jäntti (1998) find that children from large families in Sweden, 
Finland, and the US can expect to earn less than children from small families. Björklund 
et al. (2004) study the relation between birth order, family size and gender composition 
and earnings in Sweden, Finland and Norway. They find that those who belong to a 
family of two children have 10 per cent higher earnings than those who belong to a 
family of five or more children, while the earnings differential by birth-order and gender 
 
6 Black et al. use twin data to address this issue, so the ambition is to study causal effects. 
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composition was small.  Finally, Raaum and Aabo (2001) find that first-born children in 
Norway obtain more education than their siblings. Overall, these findings indicate the 
importance of integrating the birth-order and family size analyses, in order to avoid 
mistaking one effect for another. Further, the above studies show that birth order and 
especially family size, seems to matter for the individuals’ future outcomes. Now the 
question is if they also matter for the intergenerational income relation. 
 
4. Empirical framework 
A traditional model of the relation between the income of parents and children is  
ipici YY  +++)1(
where ciY is the long-run log income of child c in family i, Ypi is the long-run log income 
of parent p in family i, and i is a random component distributed as N(0,  2 ). 
measures the elasticity of the children’s income with respect to parents’ income. 
Consequently, (1- ) refers to the degree of income mobility. If the children’s income has 
the same variance as the parents’ income,  also equals the intergenerational correlation. 
If the variances differ, the correlation can be obtained by multiplying the elasticity 
coefficient by the ratio of the standard deviations of the parents’ and the children’s 
incomes. 
Income averages taken over several years are used in estimation because they 
produce a better measure of long-run income than single-year measures of income 
(Solon 1992). A parent’s income is usually measured later in the life cycle compared to 
the children, so therefore intergenerational income mobility studies usually include age 
controls in the regressions to adjust for the life-cycle variation in income of both 
generations. In the present study, children are of similar age and therefore the age 
variables for children are not included. Least squares is applied to the regression 
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9
where Yci  is the son’s (daughter’s) log income in 1999 and Y pi  is the average of the 
fathers’ (mothers’) log incomes in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. Api  is the fathers’ 
(mothers’) average age during the income years and A ci2 is the average of the fathers’ 
(mothers’) squared age during those years.  
Note that the left hand side variable is current income of the young generation in 
1999 instead of an income average. Income of the young generation is also available in 
1996, but the choice to use current income is made in order to measure income at a time 
when the individuals in the sample have reached a higher age level.7
A previous finding is that the intergenerational income elasticity tends to rise with the 
average age of the children in the sample (Reville 1995). There is then an obvious risk in 
this type of analysis that age effects are mistaken for birth-order effects. One solution is 
to use individuals of similar age but who still have different birth-order positions and 
belong to families of different sizes. To allow for birth-order and family-size effects, 
individuals of similar age are divided into sub-samples, depending on birth-order position 
and family size.8 Separate regressions are then run based on these samples: children 
without siblings; first-born children in two-child families; second-born children in two-
child families; and so forth. In this way, the individual’s birth order and family size are 
integrated in the estimation of intergenerational income elasticity.  
 
7 Using a two-year average of income in the dependent variable does not change the results in the 
analysis.  
8 Note that the individuals in the study are not related to each other and that gender composition is not 
taken into account. 
 
ipipipici AAYY  ++++=
2
3210)2(
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5. Data 
5.1 Description of data and sample selection 
The data used in this study are entirely based on administrative records kept by Statistics 
Sweden. The analysis is based on a random sample of individuals born in Sweden 
between 1962 and 1964, and their parents. All together, they amount to nearly 74,000 
individuals. Information on family size and birth order of the young generation is 
collected from the second generation register. Note that the siblings of the individuals in 
the sample may be born before 1962 or after 1964. In fact, births are registered in the 
data from 1932 to 1998, so the parents in the study are likely to have completed their 
child-conceiving years. Half siblings and adopted children can be identified in the data, 
but only biological whole-siblings are included in the analysis. The reason is that an 
individual probably has more in common with a biological sibling than with a half sibling 
or adopted sibling. In order to make the results of the analysis easier to interpret, families 
where the biological siblings also have half siblings or adopted siblings are excluded. 
Income data are gathered from registers based on employers’ compulsory reports to 
the tax authorities. The income variables are annual labor income—including sickness 
benefits, parents’ allowances, and income from farming activity—and total income, 
which includes annual labor income, pensions, unemployment benefits, capital income 
(including realized capital gains), and income from real estate property (inkomst av annan 
fastighet).9 For the young generation, income is measured in 1999, while it is measured 
over five years for the parents - in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. 
A few restrictions are imposed on the samples used in estimation. As mentioned, the 
analysis is based on children who are born between 1962 and 1964. Still, full information 
on birth order and the number of siblings of these individuals is used. An age restriction 
 
9 Total income in 1970 is the net of deductions while total income in 1975 and 1980 is not. The 
difference, however, is expected to be very small. 
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on the parents is applied, including those born in 1925 and later and the parents are also 
required to be alive in 1990.10 The former restriction is applied in order to exclude most 
parents who reach pension age before 1990.  
As a baseline income restriction, the children are required to have a positive income 
in 1999, while the parents are required to have a positive average income over the income 
years. One could argue that only parents who have a positive income every year should 
be included. There is a trade-off between achieving a good measure of long-run 
income—which is promoted by including as many income observations per individual as 
possible—and avoiding that the sample is biased toward high-income earners. Including 
only those individuals who report positive income in all years produces a better measure 
of long-run income. But excluding those who have experienced unemployment would 
increase the sample’s average income since more low-income earners become 
unemployed. This, in turn, might alter the estimated income elasticity because high-
income earners tend to have higher income elasticity (Österberg 2000). Over-sampling 
high-income earners might also alter the analysis of family-size effects because high-
income earners tend to have fewer children. Österberg (2000) presents results using both 
types of income restrictions. The restriction that requires a positive income every year 
produces slightly higher estimates of income elasticity for fathers and sons. Also this 
study presents results using both types of income restrictions. Further, because many 
mothers worked part-time during the 1970s and 1980s, the analysis also elaborates with 
income restrictions of 10,000 and 100,000 SEK per year, in order to study the income 
relation between people who were active on the labor market.  
Previous studies have shown large differences in the income elasticity of sons and 
daughters, see Österberg (2000). So the analysis should be made separately for sons and 
daughters. Table 1 presents sample characteristics of sons and daughters. For the 
 
10 The age restriction of fathers reduces the father-son sample from 20 150 to 18 002 observations. 
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complete sample, the average annual labor income in 1999 for sons is SEK 262,000   
(EURO 28,000) and for daughters SEK 171,000 (EURO 18,000). Income averages, 
according to birth order and family size, indicate that the average income decreases with 
family size, and for a given family size it also decreases with birth order. Table 2 shows 
sample characteristics of the parents. The fathers’ average annual labor income is SEK 
238,000 which is slightly lower than the sons’ average income, while the mother’s average 
income is SEK 98,000. The average age of the fathers in 1980 is 45.7 while the average 
age of the sons in 1999 is 36 so the age difference between the generations at the time 
the income data are collected, is unusually low in this study. 
 
5.2 Measurement errors 
The estimation of the intergenerational income relation is subject to attenuation bias due 
to both classical and non-classical measurement errors. On the left hand side, classical 
measurement errors should not lead to biased estimates in the regression context. Non-
classical measurement errors, on the other hand, may induce lifecycle bias. In the analysis 
of their youngest cohort, Böhlmark and Lindquist (2005) find that current income 
captures lifetime income reasonably well for Swedish men around age 34. This cohort is 
also the one most comparable to the samples in this study. Therefore, the income 
variables of the young generation in this paper, whose average age is 36, are not likely to 
suffer from any serious lifecycle bias. 
On the right hand side, the use of a short-run measure of parental income would lead 
to a downward bias in the estimation of intergenerational elasticity. This problem is 
reduced by using an average of income from five years over a period of 21 years. Even 
though data are not available for each of the 21 years, it can be argued that using data 
from five years over such a long period of time is preferable to five years in a row. If the 
Page 12 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13
income data is subject to a shock during a particular period, this may not affect the 
average very much when income from the other years are included.  
The income of parents who are especially young or old may not be a good proxy for 
long-run income. Grawe (2005) organizes estimates of intergenerational earnings 
elasticity by mean age of fathers and finds a significant negative relationship between the 
earnings elasticity and the age of the fathers in the sample.  Section 6.3 deals with this 
problem by running regressions based on samples excluding both the youngest and 
oldest fathers. This section also runs regressions where the father’s incomes are collected 
at different points in time, in order to obtain similar age of the fathers in estimation.    
 
6. Results 
6.1 Average elasticities 
Table 3 presents estimates of average intergenerational income elasticities using several 
income restrictions. The dependent variable is the sons’ or daughters’ log labor or total 
income in 1999. The fathers’ and mothers’ income is an average of log income from five 
years over a period of 21 years. The regressions also include a constant and age and age 
squared of fathers/mothers. For fathers and sons, an income elasticity of 0.28 is 
estimated in the regression based on labor income where a positive income is required 
for at least one year. This estimate is similar to those found in Björklund and Jäntti 
(1997) and Björklund and Chadwick (2003). 
The requirement of positive income in all years for the fathers produces a larger 
estimate for labor income and total income, which is also the finding in Österberg (2000). 
Further, it is shown that the intergenerational income elasticity is stronger for labor 
income than for total income. This result might be expected because total income 
includes more public benefits than labor income. Low elasticity for total income may 
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follow from a situation where income to a large extent is determined by the welfare state 
rather than by the parent’s income level. 
For fathers and daughters, an income elasticity of 0.204 is estimated in the regression 
based on labor income where positive income is required for at least one year. As in the 
case of fathers and sons, the income relation is stronger for labor income than for total 
income. In the analysis of individuals with annual income above SEK 100,000, the 
estimates are slightly higher both for fathers and sons and fathers and daughters. The 
difference in not very large, except for the total income estimates. They increase to 0.396 
for fathers and sons and to 0.289 for fathers and daughters. 
In the analysis of the income relation between mothers and sons and daughters, it is 
clear that the choice of income restriction matters a lot. The regressions in row 1-3 yield 
low estimates for both sons and daughters, comparable with those reported for similar 
income restrictions in Österberg 2000. Including only those with an income above SEK 
100,000 yields considerably larger estimates, 0.213 for mothers and daughters and 0.266 
for mothers and sons in the labor income regression. So, when using a sample of 
mothers that mainly work fulltime, the influence of the mother’s income on her 
children’s income is almost as large as the influence of the father’s income.11 
6.2 Elasticities by birth order and family size  
Table 4 presents regression coefficients from estimations of the intergenerational income 
elasticity by birth order and family size for both fathers and sons and fathers and 
daughters. Column one and row one show the estimate for sons/daughters without 
siblings; column one and row two show the estimate for first-born sons/daughters in 
 
11 The average income of the mothers in this sample is SEK 191,000 (st. error 60,000), so it is 
reasonable to assume that most mothers work full-time.  
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two-child families; and so forth.12 The overall tendency in the father-son analysis is that 
the elasticity decreases with birth order for a given family size, especially in large families. 
In three-child families, the estimate for first-born sons deviates largely from the estimates 
for middle-born and last-born sons: the former estimate is almost twice as large as the 
latter. The far-right column provides estimates for different family sizes regardless of 
birth order. Disregarding children without siblings, the elasticity tends to decrease with 
family size. The estimates for fathers and daughters show a similar but weaker elasticity 
pattern regarding birth order, but there are no differences in the elasticity connected with 
family size.  
Regressions are also run where the fathers are required to have had a positive labor 
income in all income years and these results are found in appendix table A1. The 
estimates are similar compared to those in table 4, but the elasticity reduction by family 
size is a little smaller. Yet another regression uses total income rather than labor income. 
Because total income also includes unemployment benefits, individuals who have 
experienced unemployment are included in this analysis.13 The results show that the 
elasticity decreases with birth order for a given family size, but the decrease is smaller 
compared to the labor-income analysis. For fathers and daughters, there is no pattern in 
the income elasticity. These results are found in appendix table A2.  
Table 5 presents the results from regressions based on mother-son and mother- 
daughter samples. The estimation of an intergenerational income relation where one 
generation works part time to a large extent while the other does not, would be hard to 
interpret, therefore an income restriction of SEK 100,000 is applied. Consequently, the 
number of observations is much smaller and the division into family size and birth order 
position is done in fewer categories. For mothers and sons, the birth-order pattern is 
 
12 Note that sex composition is not taken into account here; for instance, first-born sons may have either 
younger sisters and/or younger brothers. 
13 In the labor-income analysis, fathers who have experienced unemployment are included as long as a 
positive income is reported for at least one of the income years.  
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rather the opposite compared to the result in table 4, the elasticities tend to increase with 
birth order and family size. The result for mothers and daughters on the other hand, 
shows no family-size effect and no clear pattern in the elasticity according to birth order, 
even though the elasticity of last-born daughters in families with three or more children is 
very low.   
 
6.3 Significance tests of the birth-order and family-size effects 
The question is whether the estimates of birth-order and family-size effects are 
significantly different from each other. The procedure is then to test a restricted model, 
including only one parameter for parent’s income, i.e. the case where the same elasticity 
for all birth orders and family sizes is assumed (cf. table 3), against a more general model. 
The general model allows each birth-order and family-size combination to have its own 
parameter for family income, (cf. table 4). In order to perform the tests, the data are 
pooled and regressions where birth-order and family-size variables are interacted with the 
parent’s income are run as follows:14 
ppp
ppp
ppppc
YOZYOZYOZ
YOYOYO
YZYZYZYY
244233332222
443322
443322)3(


			
+++
+++
++++=
where Yc and Yp are the income of children and parents as before and Z and O represent 
size and order. For example, pYOZ 2222 indicates the effect of parent’s income for 
children with birth order two in families with two children. Q, R and  are estimated 
parameters.  
Table 6 reports tests and p-values referring to the labor-income analysis of the 
father-son sample. Test 1 shows that a restricted model that ignores birth-order and 
 
14 The following variables are included in regression but excluded in presentation: simple dummy 
variables for order and size, order*size, age, age-squared, age variables interacted with order and size. 
This regression yields exactly the same estimates and standard errors as those in table 4. 
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family-size effects is rejected at the 1% significance level. Test 2 and 3 are performed in 
order to find out if either birth order or family size is more important then the other. 
Test 2 shows that a model that includes the size-income interactions but ignores the 
order-income interaction as well as the order-size-income interaction is significant at the 
10% significance level. Finally, test 3 shows that we can not reject a model that includes 
the order-income interactions but ignores the size-income interaction as well as the 
order-size-income interaction at conventional significance levels. So, together, the birth-
order and family-size variables contribute to the model, but the evidence is much weaker 
when the separate effects of the two variables are analyzed.15 In the father-daughter, 
mother-daughter and mother-son samples, there are no significant birth-order or family-
size effects.  
To summarize, a traditional analysis that measures the average elasticity of labor 
income (table 3), shows an elasticity of 0.28 for fathers and sons and 0.20 for fathers and 
daughters. In the mother-son and mother-daughter samples, the elasticity is only 0.04 
when positive income is required for at least one year. When an income above SEK 
100,000 is required every year, the elasticity is 0.27 for mothers and sons and 0.21 for 
mothers and daughters. When allowing for family-size effects, the elasticity tends to 
decrease with family size for fathers and sons. Further, allowing for birth-order effects 
within each family size leads to estimates that decrease with birth order, especially in the 
labor income analysis. For fathers and sons, the estimates of first-born children are 
between two and three times the size of the estimates for last-born children in large 
families. The results for fathers and daughters are similar but weaker.  
 
15 The effects are not fully separated since the size-order-income interactions are included. It is also 
worth noting that separation of the birth-order effects from the family- size effects is complicated by 
the fact that being, for example, the fourth child implicates that the child comes from a family of at 
least four and so on. 
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6.4 A closer look at the birth-order pattern 
This section tries to understand why income elasticity tends to decrease with birth order 
for a given family size. As mentioned in section 4.2, the intergenerational income 
elasticity tends to rise with the average age of the children in the sample. Further, Grawe 
(2006) finds that the elasticity decreases when fathers are observed late in life rather than 
early, so the age of both generations seems to be crucial. In the birth-order and family 
size analysis, the father’s age varies depending on the child’s birth-order position because 
fathers of children with high birth order are, on average, older than fathers of first-born 
children. To find out if the results are sensitive to the age of the fathers, regressions are 
run based on samples excluding both the youngest and oldest fathers. The results are not 
sensitive to the exclusion of fathers who were age 50 or older in 1980, or the fathers who 
were age 35 or younger in 1980.  
A more careful way to address this problem is to measure income earlier for some 
fathers. Table 2 shows fathers’ average age by birth order position of their children. If the 
income in 1990 is dropped from the average income for fathers of children with position 
2 in the birth order, these fathers’ average age over the income years drops from 46.8 to 
44.3. Similarly, if the incomes in 1985 and 1990 are dropped for fathers of children with 
position 3 and 4+ in the birth order, an average age of 44.5(+/- 1) years is attained for all 
fathers in the sample. With this method we will of course have to accept potential 
problems of measuring income at different times, but the adjustment needed to correct 
the age difference is not very large. For fathers of first-born children, income is measured 
in all five years as before in the paper, while the income of fathers of second-born 
children, is measured in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 and finally the income of fathers of 
children who are number three or higher in the birth order position, is measured in 1970, 
1775 and 1980. The appendix table A3 reports estimates from this exercise and it is clear 
that the birth-order pattern can not be explained by differences in the age of the fathers 
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at the time the income data are collected. The estimate for second-born sons in three-
child-families rises from .249 to .270, and for second-born daughters in two-child-
families the estimate fall from .175 to .161 so in this case the birth-order difference 
becomes larger. Most other changes in the estimates are at decimal level.  
The data allow one of the hypotheses belonging to the main categories described in 
section 2 to be tested. The separation hypothesis suggests that the tendency of income 
elasticity to decrease with birth order may be explained by the incidence of parental 
separations, because they are likely to affect the later-born children the most. In the case 
where the children are separated from the father, a weaker income relation between the 
father and the later-born children may be expected. Björklund and Chadwick (2003) 
analyze income elasticities in both intact and separated families. They find that sons who 
always lived with their biological fathers have a labor income elasticity of 0.25. Sons who 
sometimes lived with their biological fathers have an elasticity of 0.20-0.23, while sons 
who never lived with their biological fathers have a very low elasticity not significantly 
different from zero.  
To test the separation hypothesis, an analysis is made exclusively on children who 
lived with their fathers in 1970 and 1975, when they were ages 6-8 and 11-13, 
respectively. If the income elasticity would not decrease with birth order in the analysis 
that only includes individuals from intact families, this would be in line with a separation 
hypothesis. Table 7 presents the results for sons and daughters who lived with their 
fathers in 1970 and 1975 and where the fathers’ labor income is required to be positive 
for at least one of the income years. The elasticity of both sons and daughters without 
siblings, is larger compared with the estimate in table 4, where the separated families were 
included. Thus there is a stronger income relation in one-child families between fathers 
and sons who have lived together during the son’s upbringing. In families with more than 
one child, this effect is not present. In three-child families, the elasticity of last-born sons 
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in three-child families and last-born daughters in two child families have increased 
compared to the results in table 4. This result is weakly in line with the assumptions of a 
separation hypothesis.  
Section 2 also discusses the “child quantity – child quality” trade-off when 
describing a situation where economic and social family resources become diluted as the 
family grows. The result found in the main analysis, that the income elasticity tends to 
decrease with family size for fathers and sons, is in line with the “child quantity – child 
quality” trade-off. 
Finally, the last category, cultural factors, suggest potential reasons why birth order 
would affect an individual’s future outcome, for example, the old tradition among 
farmers that the eldest son inherits the farm or the family company. To the extent that 
this tradition continues, one may expect higher income elasticity among first-born 
children.16 The results in this paper are to some extent in line with this prediction. Table 
4 shows that the estimate for first-born sons from three-child families is much larger 
than the estimates for middle-born and last-born sons. One way to approach this 
problem is to find out if there is an abundance of first-born children among the self-
employed. Table 8 shows the fraction of self-employed children in different birth-order 
and family-size categories: there is no abundance of self-employed among first-born sons 
or daughters. Rather, the small differences indicate the opposite pattern. So the results 
are not in line with this hypothesis. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The main finding of this paper is that there seems to be birth-order and family-size 
patterns in the transmission of economic status between fathers and sons. The income 
 
16 There may, however, be problems when measuring income of farmers and the self-employed. For 
example, self-employed people may not report income as wages. 
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elasticity tends to decrease with birth order for a given family size, especially in the labor-
income analysis. In large families, there is a sizable difference in income elasticity 
between first and last-born sons: in three child families, the estimate for first-born sons is 
almost twice as large and in four-child families, the estimate for first-born sons is almost 
three times as large. Disregarding children without siblings, the elasticity also tends to 
decrease with family size. These differences can not be explained by differences in the 
age of the fathers at the time the income data are collected and the differences in birth-
order and family-size estimates are significant. The estimates for fathers and daughters 
show a similar but weaker elasticity pattern regarding birth order, but the differences are 
not significant. In the mother-daughter and mother-son samples, there are no significant 
birth-order or family-size effects.  
The results on birth order are weakly in line with one of the predicted birth-order 
effects discussed in the paper. The separation hypothesis predicts a weaker income 
relation between an absent father and later-born children and the results for sons in 
three-child families and daughters in two-child families are weakly in line with this 
hypothesis. Still, the other estimates do not support a separation hypothesis. The birth-
order differences revealed in the paper might be explained by psychological factors, such 
as the hypothesis that younger children regard older siblings as role models and are 
influenced by them rather than their parents. This may generate weaker income relations 
between parents and later-born children compared to first-borns or an only child.  
Future research might go further to identify central mechanisms behind the dynamic 
process of income transmission between different family members. One task is to find 
out if income elasticity to some degree is connected to fertility rates and explore if that 
might help explain the different income elasticity levels in countries with varying fertility 
rates. Another task would be to replicate this study using US data. It would be interesting 
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to find out if there are any birth-order and family size effects in a society where the 
average intergenerational income elasticity is so much higher than in Sweden. 
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Table 1. Sample characteristics of children 
St.     
Variable Mean dev. Min. Max N 
Sons: 
Age in 1999 35.9 0.81 35 37  18,002 
Income (SEK 1000s) 262  166  .05  8,180  18,002 
Income by birth order and family size: 
 No siblings 256    133  .4 965     1,289 
 Two-child families  271  165 .1 3,724  8,094 
 1st 277   182 .3 3,724    4,522 
 2nd 261  140 .1 2,465    3,572 
 Three-child families 263 178  .05 8,180    5,717 
 1st 269  221 .3 8,180   2,188
 2nd 262  148  .3 1,796   2,097 
 3rd 257  142  .05 2,097   1,432 
 Four- or more child families 240  158  .07 5,333   2,902 
 1st 263  254  .2 5,333      617 
 2nd 232  121 .2 1,043       649 
 3rd 236  123  .07 1,047    754 
 4th 233  113 .4 953    882 
Daughters: 
Age in 1999 36.0 0.81 35 37 18,813 
Income (SEK 1000s) 171 96  .04 2,575 18,813 
Income by birth order and family size:  
 No siblings 173 101  .1 906 1,660 
 Two-child families 176 97  .04 2,575 8,230 
 1st 178 96  .04 1,217 4,490 
2nd 172 99 .4 2,575 3,740 
Three-child families 170 99 .1 2,113 5,810 
 1st 171 97 .1 1,022 2,075 
2nd 172 95 .1 1,282 1,935 
3rd 166 103 .2 2,113 1,800 
Four-child families + 159 83 .1 944 3,113 
 1st 164 90 .8 944 532 
2nd 158 79 .1 460 607 
3rd 158 83 .4 531 804 
4th 158 82 .1 819 1,170 
Note: Income refers to (non-zero) labor income in 1999. The summary measures of sons come 
from the father and son sample while the summary measures of daughters come from the 
mothers and daughters sample. Income is expressed in the price level of year 2000. 
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Table 2. Sample characteristics of parents 
Variable  St.    
Mean dev. Min. Max N 
Fathers 
 Age in 1980  45.7 4.8 33.0    55.0 18,002 
 Income (SEK 1000s) 238 115  .6  1,884  18,002 
Income by number of children: 
 One child 218   88      .8     981   1,289 
 Two children 240 103 4.2  1,652 8,094 
 Three children 245 125   .6  1,884   5,717 
 Four or more children  226 132 1.0  1,560 2,902 
Age in 1980 by number of children: 
 One child 45.7  5.2 34.0 55.0    1,289 
 Two children 45.3  4.7 33.0 55.0  8,094 
 Three children 45.7  4.9 34.0 55.0 5,717 
 Four or more children  46.7  4.9 33.0 55.0 2,902 
Age in 1980 by birth-order position of child:
Fathers of first-born children  43.6 4.5 33.0 55.0 8,616 
Fathers of children who are no. 2  46.8 4.2 35.0  55.0 6,318 
 Fathers of children who are no. 3  48.9 3.9 35.0  55.0 2,186 
 Fathers of children who are no. 4+ 50.5 3.4 38.0  55.0 882 
Mothers 
Age in 1980 43.5 5.1 32.0  55.0 18,813 
Income (SEK 1000s) 98 58  .3 991 18,813 
Income by number of children 
 One child 108 58  .3 377 1,660 
 Two children 100 54  .3 803 8,230 
 Three children 96 61  .3 991 5,810 
 Four or more children 87 57  .3 549 3,113 
Age in 1980 by number of children: 
 One child 42.7 5.6 32.0 55.0 1,660 
 Two children 43.1 4.8 32.0 55.0 8,230 
 Three children 43.5 5.1 32.0 55.0 5,810 
 Four or more children 45.0 5.3 32.0 55.0 3,113 
Age in 1980 by birth-order position of child:
Mothers of first-born children 41.0 4.5 32.0 55.0  8,757 
Mothers of children who are no. 2 44.5 4.4 33.0 55.0  6,282 
Mothers of children who are no. 3 47.1 4.1 36.0 55.0  2,604 
Mothers of children who are no. 4+ 48.8 3.9 38.0 55.0  1,170 
Note: Income measure: average annual labor income during the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 
1990.  ‘Children who are no. 4+’ refers to children who have birth-order position 4 or higher. 
Income is expressed in the price level of year 2000. 
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Table 3 Estimated intergenerational income elasticities. Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. Income restrictions applied to both generations.
Variable Labor income Total income Labor income Total income
Fathers and sons Mothers and sons
Positive income in .280 .273 .041 .028
at least one year (.013) (.012) (.007) (.006)
18,001 18,698 19,827 20,852
Positive income in .305 .299 .014 .021
every year (.016) (.013) (.012) (.010)
15,672 17,826 10,000 11,550
Income over .301 .319 .046 .050
10,000 SEK in every year (.012) (.010) (.013) (.010)
15,097 17,546 8,445 9,870
Income over .342 .396 .266 .314
100,000 SEK in every year (.010) (.010) (.038) (.037)
11,827 14,747 1,832 2,275
Fathers and daughters Mothers and daughters
Positive income in .204 .171 .043 .042
at least one year (.015) (.012) (.008) (.006)
16,957 17,646 18,812 19,808
Positive income in .244 .184 .073 .056
every year (.018) (.013) (.013) (.009)
14,840 16,847 9,465 11,000
Income over .244 .213 .088 .091
10,000 SEK in every year (.014) (.010) (.013) (.010)
14,140 16,565 7,886 9,331
Income over .259 .289 .213 .257
100,000 SEK in every year (.010) (.009) (.033) (.030)
9,859 13,119 1,544 2,034
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Table 4. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in labor income by birth order and family size. Fathers-sons and fathers-daughters samples.
No. of children
in family Birth order
Fathers and sons Fathers and daughters
1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+ All
1 .237 .237 .205 .205
(.052) (.052) (.062) (.062)
1,288 1,288 1,211 1,211
2 .336 .308 .326 .190 .175 .185
(.028) (.032) (.021) (.031) (.036) (.024)
4,521 3,571 8,093 4,383 3,257 7,641
3 .356 .249 .196 .269 .275 .187 .134 .204
(.039) (.037) (.040) (.022) (.043) (.045) (.046) (.026)
2,187 2,096 1,431 5,716 2,100 1,860 1,428 5,390
4+ .301 .220 .228 .110 .203 .107 .095 .393 .123 .198
(.075) (.060) (.058) (.052) (.030) (.077) (.067) (.069) (.069) (.035)
616 648 753 881 2,901 548 614 713 834 2,712
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefits, parental
allowances, and income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 for fathers. Positive
income in 1999 is required for sons and daughters and in at least one of the income years for fathers.
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Table 5. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in labor income by birth order and family size. Mothers-sons and mothers-daughters samples.
No. of children
in family Birth order
Mothers and sons Mothers and daughters
1 2 3+ All 1 2 3+ All
1 .111 .111 .301 .301
(.112) (.112) (.098) (.098)
300 300 248 248
2 .150 .294 .236 .235 .167 .212
(.016) (.017) (.058) (.075) (.062) (.049)
427 431 859 367 380 748
3+ .258 .274 .346 .334 .176 .283 .062 .188
(.108) (.012) (.079) (.056) (.096) (.112) (.080) (.052)
171 168 330 671 147 139 258 546
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefits,
parental allowances, and income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 for
mothers. Income over 100,000 SEK in every year is required for both generations.
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Table 6. Significance tests
Test: P-value
1) Ho: Restricted model: Q2 =Q3=Q4=R2=R2 =R4 =
22 = 33 = 42 =0 0.005
H1: General model
2) Ho: Restricted model: R2=R2 =R4 =
22 = 33 = 42 =0 0.100
H1: :General model
3) Ho: Restricted model: Q2 =Q3=Q4=
22 = 33 = 42 =0 0.113
H1: :General model
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Table 7. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in labor income by birth order and family size. Same household as the father at least in 1970 and 1975.
No. of children
in family Birth order
Fathers and sons Fathers and daughters
1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+ All
1 .255 .255 .274 .274
(.057) (.057) (.070) (.070)
1,130 1,130 1,068 1,068
2 .344 .264 .301 .202 .201 .204
(.029) (.034) (.022) (.032) (.037) (.024)
4,329 3,359 7,689 4,188 3,080 7,269
3 .364 .243 .234 .282 .286 .179 .134 .205
(.040) (.040) (.044) (.024) (.045) (.047) (.048) (.027)
2,117 2,006 1,352 5,477 2,014 1,786 1,335 5,137
4+ .199 .212 .252 .124 .193 .120 .136 .382 .095 .199
(.086) (.062) (.061) (.054) (.031) (.081) (.072) (.068) (.071) (.036)
589 627 714 822 2,755 528 588 680 771 2,570
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefits, parental
allowances, and income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 for fathers. Positive
income in 1999 is required for sons and daughters and in at least one of the income years for fathers.
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Table 8. Fraction of self-employed children by birth order and family size.
No. of children
in family Birth order
Sons Daughters
1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+ All
1 .056 .056 .031 .031
2 .048 .054 .051 .026 .030 .028
3 .055 .054 .068 .059 .034 .037 .034 .035
4+ .058 .070 .062 .065 .064 .031 .033 .024 .023 .026
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Appendix
Table A1. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in labor income between fathers and sons and fathers and daughters. Positive income in every year.
No. of children
in family Birth order
Fathers and sons Fathers and daughters
1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+ All
1 .243 .243 .219 .219
(.070) (.070) (.072) (.072)
1,082 1,082 1,063 1,063
2 .365 .293 .334 .229 .228 .233
(.032) (.037) (.024) (.037) (.042) (.028)
4,146 3,094 7,241 4,023 2,860 6,884
3 .357 .305 .218 .301 .351 .201 .144 .243
(.043) (.046) (.048) (.026) (.049) (.052) (.059) (.030)
2,002 1,858 1,149 5,011 1,913 1,647 1,428 4,715
4+ .209 .321 .210 .210 .238 .233 .123 .385 .145 .248
(.090) (.075) (.077) (.066) (.038) (.107) (.085) (.074) (.093) (.044)
553 552 636 591 2,335 482 534 583 573 2,175
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefits, parental
allowances, and income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 for fathers.
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Table A2. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in total income for sons and daughters born between 1962 and 1964
No. of children
in family Birth order
Fathers and sons Fathers and daughters
1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+ All
1 .382 .382 .155 .155
(.055) (.055) (.048) (.048)
1,350 1,350 1,266 1,266
2 .329 .252 .294 .138 .158 .148
(.027) (.027) (.019) (.027) (.028) (.020)
4,701 3,691 8,393 4,533 3,392 7,926
3 .292 .268 .204 .258 .243 .176 .211 .213
(.034) (.036) (.034) (.020) (.033) (.033) (.041) (.020)
2,262 2,174 1,486 5,924 2,190 1,933 1,481 5,606
4+ .265 .173 .247 .172 .209 .196 .103 .221 -.001 .123
(.057) (.059) (.043) (.035) (.024) (.056) (.052) (.054) (.046) (.026)
645 671 788 921 3,028 573 637 743 889 2,845
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log total income (annual labor income, pensions, unemployment
benefits, capital income (including capital gains), and income from real estate property). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970,
1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 for fathers. Positive income in 1999 is required for sons and daughters and in at least one of the income years for fathers.
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Table A3. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in labor income between fathers and sons and fathers and daughters. Similar age of fathers*
No. of children
in family Birth order
Fathers and sons Fathers and daughters
1 2 3 4+ All 1 2 3 4+ All
1 .237 .237 .205 .205
(.052) (.052) (.062) (.062)
1,288 1,288 1,211 1,211
2 .336 .302 .324 .190 .161 .181
(.028) (.032) (.021) (.031) (.035) (.023)
4,521 3,571 8,093 4,383 3,257 7,641
3 .356 .270 .196 .277 .275 .179 .134 .200
(.039) (.037) (.040) (.022) (.043) (.045) (.046) (.026)
2,187 2,096 1,431 5,716 2,100 1,860 1,428 5,390
4+ .301 .228 .228 .110 .200 .107 .089 .393 .121 .191
(.075) (.060) (.058) (.052) (.030) (.077) (.063) (.069) (.069) (.035)
616 648 753 881 2,901 548 614 713 834 2,712
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness
benefits, parental allowances, and income from farming activity). *Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in different years for
fathers in order to collect income at similar age. See the text (section 6.2) for more details. Positive income in 1999 is required for sons and
daughters and in at least one of the income years for fathers.
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